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Delegate Voting at the 1787 Constitutional Convention:
The Entanglement of Economic Interests and the Great Compromise

How did the economic interests of the delegates to the 1787 Constitutional Convention impact
delegate voting before and after the resolution of the Great Compromise? This research introduces
the use of a delegate’s deviation from his state’s majority as the dependent variable in a model that
divides the Convention into two periods around the Compromise. Covariates include several
measures of a delegate’s economic interest, proxies for his personal ideology, and controls for his
place of origin. Results indicate that three economic interests (owning a greater number of slaves, a
home county further from navigable water, and holding public securities) significantly impacted the
likelihood of a delegate voting contrary to the majority position of his state in a way that was not the
same before and after the Compromise. These results imply not only that personal economic
interests were significant players during the creation of the U.S. Constitution, but that the structure
of the legislative branch and these three economic interests go hand in hand.
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comments and suggestions, as well as the rest of the Oberlin Economics Department. Special thanks
to Terri Pleska, Jim Westwood, Margaret Klute, Daniel Highkin, and Emma Blackford for their
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1 Introduction
The delegates to the Constitutional Convention, a room full of demi-gods, conspirers in a
Devil’s Bargain—all ascriptions given throughout the lifetime of the United States to a group of
nothing more and nothing less than an assortment of humans charged with the impressive mission
of creating the United States. The results of the debates of the 1787 Constitutional Convention
continue to have critical significance on the lives of people within the United States and beyond;
thus, studying these roots of our political system remains relevant when thinking critically about the
current political reality. I contribute an empirical perspective to the litany of qualitative and
quantitative literature on the topic of the Constitution by posing these questions: How might
economic interests have affected delegates’ voting behavior at the 1787 Constitutional Convention
in Philadelphia? Are these interests reflected by a change in voting patterns after the Great
Compromise? Might these interests have led delegates to deviate from their states’ majority
positions?
Charles Beard’s 1913 work An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution introduced the notion that
the Constitution is an economic document—that it can be viewed as a contention between the
various economic interests of the Founders, instead of as an untarnished emblem of Enlightenment
principles. While Beard’s specific hypothesis has not withstood over a century of critical review, his
idea of an “Economic Constitution” lives on. Empirical work testing a wide range of hypotheses
regarding how economic and ideological interests may have informed voting at the Convention
consistently suggests that delegate-specific economic characteristics were significant influencers of
voting at the Convention, especially on issues related to those interests.
My research stands apart from the existing empirical literature on delegate voting by its unique
combination of three specific components: a dependent variable that is free of researcher-imposed
subjectivity, a model that encompasses, rather than bypasses, the temporal dimension of the
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convention, and the utilization of a recently compiled dataset that is arguably the most
comprehensive, yet still true to its primary source, as is feasible.
I use two datasets in this paper. Professor Keith Dougherty of the University of Georgia
provided a full range of descriptive data for each of the fifty-five delegates to the Convention and
for each of the twelve attending states (Rhode Island chose not to attend the Convention). I
obtained a second dataset giving state votes and inferring delegate positions (“yea” or “nay”) on the
620 substantive roll calls throughout the Convention from the Constitutional Convention Research
Group (CCRG). The positions of the individual men are crucial to understanding voting at the
delegate level, but these positions are difficult or in some cases impossible to know; the delegates did
not vote as individuals during the Convention. Instead, they each voted within their state’s
delegation, and each state voiced its position to the general assembly. Official Convention records
therefore list only the state votes, not those of the delegates. This fact required an extensive
examination of primary source records by Dougherty et al (2012), who have produced the most
exhaustive collection of the individual delegate positions currently feasible. These data are relatively
new in the empirical literature on the Convention, and so advantage my analysis over earlier studies
of the Convention.
It is on Dougherty’s compilation of individual delegate positions that I base the binary
dependent variable of my logistic regression model—an indicator that equals one if a delegate
deviates from his state’s majority on any particular vote, and zero if he votes with his state’s
majority. Through a slight alteration to the theoretical model presented by McGuire (2003), the
event of a delegate deviating from his state’s majority is a powerful indicator of a delegate’s personal
interests in voting. McGuire’s model and my own cast a delegate’s voting as a function of two broad
categories of interest: delegate-specific interests (such as the number of slaves owned by a delegate
or his religion) and state-specific interests (such as state population and the number of slaves per
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capita). To tailor McGuire’s general model to the dependent variable here, I construe an increase in
the likelihood of a delegate’s deviating from his state’s majority position to indicate an increase in
the influence of some characteristic he does not necessarily share with his fellow state delegates. For
the purposes of this paper, I am particularly focusing on the delegate-specific interests that are
economic in nature.
No other author has directly measured a delegate’s deviation from his state’s majority as a metric
of his personal interest. There are studies that use a small sample of votes, or that utilize spatial
modeling techniques to discern similarity in voting between any of the delegates. Of these, the
former is incapable of speaking to voting patterns of a Convention that continuously evolved over
its four-month span, and the latter (a close cousin of my measure of a delegate’s similarity to his
fellows) is less equipped to test hypotheses on specific delegate characteristics. Other pooled
regression models do reach across a wide range of votes by coding them as a one or a zero based on
whether they are “pro-national” or not. However, this imposes an inherent subjectivity onto the
data—it requires the researcher to make the content-based decision of how to label each vote
according to a binary metric. My method can apply to almost1 the full set of individual delegate
positions—for a total of 4,870 observations—without bending any data away from the primary
source.
The vote later deemed the “Great Compromise” constitutes the break around which I model a
logistic regression of this binary measure of deviation. Prior to the Great Compromise, it was
unknown whether legislative seats would be apportioned to each state evenly, or instead according
to population. The decision that came with the 156 th roll-call vote of the Convention—that there
would be a Senate in which two senators represented each state, regardless of its size, and a House

I cannot measure a delegate’s deviation from his state’s majority in the 118 cases in which the delegate’s position is
known, but the state vote is “divided” between yeas and nays. I correct for this in the model by controlling for whether a
delegation is an even number in size, for this would directly speak to the likelihood of an even split of his delegation.
1
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of Representatives with membership apportioned by the size of their state—imparted to each
delegate at the Convention the knowledge of where in the legislative hierarchy he and his state
would stand. As historical analyses on the intricacies of the Convention reveal, the issue of legislative
apportionment was crucial in several other simultaneously occurring debates—most significantly,
those regarding the commercial powers of the new government, how to address the admission of
new states into the Union, and of course the ever-present (though sometimes not explicitly
mentioned) debate over slavery (Collier et al (1986)). An extensive examination of these debates
suggests the question underlying my empirical analysis: Before a delegate knows how much power
his state will hold in the new federal government, how can he know what other constitutional
arrangements will best benefit himself and his state?
I do not mean to imply that the only mover of a delegate’s position during the Convention was a
purely selfish or self-interested motive. However, scholarship consistently suggests that delegates’
personal interests significantly influence their votes on issues related to those interests. This is the
basis on which to imagine the Great Compromise as a key piece of information in the Convention,
and one directly related to patterns in delegates’ economic interests. I hypothesize that a delegate’s
likelihood to deviate from his state’s majority changes with the Great Compromise. The direction I
expect the change in voting patterns after the Great Compromise to take is ambiguous—whether a
delegate’s economic interests (or any specific interest) would be more or less impactful on his
probability of deviation after the Compromise.
The covariates of this model fall into three categories: economic variables, noneconomic
variables, and structural controls. The economic variables are those of analytic primary interest—
delegate-specific indicators of wealth and economic standing include: the number of slaves a
delegate owned, whether he owned public or private securities, whether he owned Western land, and
the distance from the center of his home county to navigable water (a measure of his shipping and
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commercial interest). The effects of these variables on a delegate’s probability of deviating from his
state’s majority position are estimated in each of the two periods, to test the hypothesis that in each
period their impact on a delegate’s deviation from his state’s majority differs. The noneconomic
variables included in the regression are not modelled in two periods before and after the
Compromise, as their purpose is to control for other individual characteristics that might have
influenced a delegate’s probability of deviating from his state’s majority. These variables are: a
delegate’s age, his years of legislative, executive, and judicial experience, and dummy variables for
English ancestry, holding an officer role in the Revolutionary War, and religion. Lastly, the structural
controls account for the size of the delegation and also whether its size is an even number, as both
could impact the likelihood of a delegate’s deviation.
Results indicate that owning a greater number of slaves and origins in a county further from
navigable water each increases the likelihood of a delegate voting contrary to the majority position of
his state after (and only after) the Compromise. The model also shows that delegates who own
public securities are more likely to deviate before (and only before) the Compromise. These results
support the hypothesis concerning a difference between the two periods in how economic interests
manifest themselves in delegate voting. Additionally, delegates who subscribe to a hierarchical
religion (Catholic, Episcopalian) are significantly more likely to deviate from their state’s majority
throughout the entire Convention, as well as delegates who were former officers in the
Revolutionary War.
An examination of the marginal effects of the economic characteristics, pre- and post-, reveals
that these factors were not hugely significant movers of a delegate’s actual probability of deviation in
the context of this empirical model. However, the consistent nature of the significance still suggests
an important impact of these variables. Countless forces laid their mark on these debates, and
obscured instances of a delegate voting his true interests—biasing results against any results. The
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fact that some variables nonetheless emerge as significant here is more meaningful in this context.
The results of these empirical tests stand on the side of an economic interpretation of the
Constitution, and also act illustratively to the specific story around the Great Compromise.
Section 2, 3, 4, and 5 summarize the historical, epistemological, empirical, and theoretical
background on the Constitution, the Constitutional Convention, and my specific hypotheses,
respectively. Section 6 describes the data, and in Section 7 I specify my model and empirical strategy.
In Section 8, I present my results, and in Section 9, I discuss their implication. Section 10 concludes
this research.

2 Historical Background on the Constitutional Convention
The Revolutionary War won from England the independence of thirteen sovereign states, not
that of a single country. The union of the early 1780s resembled the modern United Nations more
closely than our current United States in many ways: States issued their own currencies and could
impose tariffs on one other, and the central body—a Confederation Congress which met to discuss
issues common to all thirteen states—lacked both an executive branch and any means of enforcing
its requisitions for taxes. Danger loomed from all sides: England and Spain presented continual
threats to independence, and domestic economic difficulties verged into social crises, a phenomenon
particularly apparent in the event of Shays Rebellion2.
The political leaders of the day found the Articles of Confederation, which governed the states
during the Revolutionary War and the years immediately following, deeply deficient for that
precarious moment of history. The Annapolis Convention, attended by James Madison and

Shays Rebellion took place in Massachusetts in the Spring of 1787, just before the Convention began. Men thrown into
debtors’ prison as victims of a highly volatile economic period took it upon themselves to fight back, led by Daniel
Shays. Its significance here lies in how for many contemporaries Shays Rebellion was the tipping point towards belief in
the necessity of a new system of government, as no federal force was able to stop the rebellion—it was the
Massachusetts state militia that did (Collier).
2
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Alexander Hamilton, among others, met in the Fall of 1786 to discuss a solution and resolved to call
a general convention the following summer in Philadelphia for the sole purpose of proposing
amendments to the Articles. Over the four-month convention, however, these delegates far
overreached this directive and created an entirely new system of government, which endures to the
present—the longest lasting Constitution in modern history.
The Convention met in secrecy, and from the first debate allowed for the reconsideration of any
resolution at any point. Representing twelve states (Rhode Island chose not to attend), these fiftyfive men held diverse political experience and opinions on human nature. However, they were
uniform in the sense that each held a generally federalist (supportive of a strong central government,
as opposed to advocating the prioritization of state sovereignty) attitude and a level of political
recognition sufficient to gain appointment to his state’s delegation. These men were not
representatives in that they were appointed (not elected) by their state legislatures (except for the
delegates from South Carolina, appointed by their governor), and they did not face reelection, since
the Convention met only once. However, the delegates bore some accountability for their actions in
Philadelphia—each knew that he would eventually bring whatever the Convention produced back to
his state, and that his pre-existing political career might suffer or thrive according to the
Constitution’s reception.
Thomas Jefferson, who did not attend the Convention, dubbed it an “assembly of demi-gods,”
and as these men embarked on the incredibly complicated and convoluted Philadelphia project, they
knew the momentous place in history the house of cards they built would occupy. Slowly and
laboriously, these men debated various plans of government, represented in the 620 substantive roll
call votes held throughout the Convention. The delegates voted based on the information given by
the cumulative process of the convention, and so while many of these roll calls posed questions

9
nearly identical in denotation, their connotations imbibed the particular context of that vote’s place
in the series.
Between two (New Hampshire) and eight (Virginia) delegates represented each state. While the
states together appointed seventy-five men, only fifty-five ever made it to Philadelphia, because of
travel complications, illness, participation in the concurrent Continental Congress in New York, or
another obligation. Both the individual delegates and whole delegations were inconsistent in their
attendance—never did all twelve states reach simultaneous quorum3, and never were more than 42
delegates present on a particular day. Two men (counted in the 55)—George Houstoun of New
Jersey and George Wythe of Virginia —departed within the first two weeks of the Convention,
never to return. New Hampshire did not arrive until July 23 rd, and New York lost its quorum in early
July with the departure of John Lansing and Robert Yates, leaving Alexander Hamilton its sole
quorum-less yet outspoken voice.
Discussions covered many subjects, but the issue of representation troubled the delegates from
the first meeting. As a feature of the sovereign nature of the states under the Articles, each state
held equal voice in the Confederation Congress. Legislation required approval of nine states,
amendments all thirteen. Delegates from states large in population deemed this distinctly
undemocratic, as it allowed a small state to exert a hugely disproportionate influence on the large.
James Madison, representing Virginia, entered the Convention with a comprehensive plan of
government featuring a bicameral legislature with the members of each house apportioned relative
to state population. The delegates opened substantive discussion in late May with this Virginia Plan.
To the consternation of Madison and his fellow large-state-hailing representatives, however, the
delegates from the smaller states considered a legislature based in proportional representation just as

3

The number that constituted a quorum was decided by the legislature of each state individually.
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inequitable as the large states found the current Continental Congress. From their perspective, a
government of this form would render them totally impotent to the whims of the larger states.
At several points, whole small-state delegations approached the point of quitting the Convention
and abandoning the infant Constitution entirely over this issue. Idiosyncratic attendance, reasoned
discussion, and deals made on the floor as well as (probably) at the Indian Queen Tavern all played
their role in progress on resolving legislative representation. The Convention first resolved in favor
of a bicameral legislature, then on proportional representation in the lower house (the House of
Representatives). Finally came the decision on representation in the upper house (the Senate), which
allowed each state an equal voice. This final point, called the Great Compromise, settled on July
16—about halfway through the convention. Such was the controversial and heated nature of the
debates leading up to the Compromise that the delegates knew that this deal was the only way to
keep the Convention alive, and so they understood this 156th roll call vote as the final word on the
issue, with no option for reconsideration. From here forward, each delegate knew his state’s
forecasted representation in the legislative branch. For example, a delegate from Virginia could
expect ten representatives in the first House of Representatives, a delegate from Delaware could
expect one, and all delegates knew two Senators would represent his state in the upper house. This
compromise holds great significance, both for its controversy during the convention and in its
permanent effect on the U.S. government. It is a key piece in the balance of power within the
Federal government, and between the state and central governments.
Following the passage of the Great Compromise, the Convention deliberated other elements of
the new government until September 17, 1787, when 39 delegates finally stood up to sign the
finished Constitution of the United States. On this day, Benjamin Franklin closed the meeting with
words that rang home to the men who had fought and compromised in Philadelphia that summer:
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“Thus I consent, Sir, to this Constitution, because I expect no better, and I am not sure that it is not
the best.”
After months of exhaustive debate in state ratification conventions, the people of New
Hampshire resolved in favor of the Constitution on June 21, 1788 – the last of the minimum nine
states needed for the document to go into effect. A necessary contingent of state legislatures ratified
the Bill of Rights—the first ten amendments to the Constitution, and an understood condition for a
ratification vote from some states—in 1791. Seventeen additional amendments, a Civil War, and
over two hundred years of politics have altered the text of the Constitution and its place in our
society. However, the core structure and function of the current United States government exists by
the invention made over those four long, hot, summer months in Philadelphia.

3 Approaches to Understanding the Constitutional Convention
The discipline of studying the Constitution and the Founding is a history unto itself, akin in its
place in the body of legal knowledge to the actual development of the United States as a political
society. Only a handful of empirical studies of the relationship between economic interests and
voting choices exist amidst the hundreds of studies of the Convention and the thousands of studies
on the Constitution itself. In this section, I summarize the rise of economic and empirical
interpretations of the Constitution, and in the next I describe how the findings of these studies
inform the specific hypotheses and methods of this research.
Charles Beard is recognized as the first author in the field of economic interpretations of the
Constitution. In 1913, he published An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution, a contemporarily
controversial work because it highlighted the “demi” half of Jefferson’s label, after a century of
scholarship focused on the latter and “god”-like characterization. Beard identified a dichotomy
between the delegates attending the Convention that owed money in some form, and those who
held the debt of others. He suggested that creditors would support a strong national government as
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reassurance of an eventual repayment, and that debtors conversely preferred the higher potential for
leniency implied by a system that favored the supremacy of state legislatures. Still, Beard pioneered
the idea of the Constitution as an economic document—that it exists by the delegates channeling the
economic as well as political forces of their day. While different in specific hypotheses, Beard’s
thesis and my own share the general theoretical assumption that the economic interests of the
Founders influenced their voting.
Since 1913, legal, political, and historical analyses of Constitutional origins make close to
unanimous arguments against the specifics of Beard’s An Economic Interpretation. Forrest McDonald’s
1958 We the People: The Economic Origins of the Constitution took an empirical approach to evaluating
Beard’s thesis, the first quantitative study in the field. He analyzed the proceedings of both the 1787
Philadelphia Convention and the thirteen state ratifying conventions in exhaustive detail. McDonald
finds a convincing empirical basis for an economic interpretation, but also reiterates Beard’s point
that one cannot understand the creation of the U.S. Constitution through any single lens, and that
the economic motives of the founders are only some among many forces that lead to the document
the Convention finally produced. McDonald’s call for a multi-disciplinary examination
contextualizes the empirical limitations of this research.
Empirical works examining voting behavior at the Constitutional Convention since McDonald
are relatively few, and so each substantially builds from the conclusions and data of the preceding.
They fall into two broad categories: analysis of action at the state level, and at the delegate level.
Data on the state positions throughout the Convention is much easier to obtain—the Convention
Journal, kept by Secretary William Samuel Jackson (who did not vote) gives fairly comprehensive
information on the state positions throughout the meeting. For this reason, the earlier empirical
analyses do not speak to the behavior of the individual delegates, as is the goal of my research.
Regardless, their examinations of the general forces at play during the Convention are relevant here,
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especially the studies that examine how information conditions varied throughout the four months
of the Convention.
A series of works by Jillison et al (1978, 1981, 1984) does just this—he looks to changes in state
voting patterns, or changes in the composition of state voting blocs, as evidence of the political
forces and economic interests that were relevant during the Convention. These three works all use a
factor analysis technique, and their results, discussed below, inform my hypothesis that the Great
Compromise significantly influenced voting during the Convention.
From 1984 onwards, McGuire shifts the focus in the empirical literature towards analysis of the
delegate (not state) behavior. As I will describe shortly, these early models are interesting in their
ability to analyze specific economic and ideological characteristics of the delegates but are limited in
scope. Research using spatial analysis techniques (Heckelman et al (2013), Pope et al (2015)) expand
the potential for meaningful inference at the delegate level. These studies show that economic
interests manifested during the convention, particularly on issues pertaining directly to those
interests. Lastly, the dataset of delegate votes I use here, compiled by Dougherty et al (2012),
represents an invaluable contribution to the field of empirical work on the Constitutional
Convention. I detail the aspects of these empirical studies directly relevant to my work in the coming
section.

4 Hypothesis Placed in the Context of History and the Literature
In this section, I will explain the narrative behind the empirical hypotheses I will come to test,
and the intuition behind the methods and variables I use. The story this research tells is one that
combines economic theory of the study of information-conditional decision making, with the
historical course of the Convention. Namely, it focuses on the mind of the individual delegate, and it
investigates how the various interests and experiences he brings could change over the course of the
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meeting. These are not new ideas. What Charles Beard introduced and Forrest McDonald
developed, empirical work has tested and augmented.
The details of how economic interests impacted the creation of the Constitution lie in both
empirical and subjective dispute. However, there is a common theme from Beard to the present:
that there was something going on at the Convention other than simply a meeting of wills and minds
on even playing ground. Informative lines of analysis stem from nuances that any delegate himself
would have perceived, such as decisions already made by the Convention or how his words and
votes would strategically fall into the room as a whole. Given the unbroachable obstacle of a lack of
exhaustive4 primary-source data on the individual delegates, these uncertainties will probably never
reach undisputed resolve. So, in forming my hypothesis, I consider the best way to use the data I
have to address these intricacies of the Convention and still yield telling information on how
economic interests of the Founders manifested in their voting at the Convention. I discuss how best
to harness the nature of the data at hand through the creation of my dependent variable, explained
in section 4.1. I address the entanglement of delegate behavior depends and the informational
environment through my two-period analysis, described in section 4.2.

4.1

Measuring Deviation from the State Majority

Voting at the Convention occurred at two levels: The delegates first voted within their individual
delegations, and the majority position of the delegation voted to the Convention as a whole, and that
was what determined the passage or failure of any particular motion. I am using a delegate’s
deviation from his state’s majority position as the binary dependent variable in a logistic regression
model. Here, I explain why by exploring how this dependent variable is both empirically more

As I will soon describe, the dataset of individual delegate positions is arguably the most exhaustive feasible, yet still it
gives only 20% of all potential individual delegate positions.
4
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robust than other alternatives in the literature and posit its capability to shed light onto the delegates’
behavior at the convention.
The first few ventures into empirical examinations of delegate behavior at the individual level are
variations on one combination of theme and method: The author first ascertains the individual
delegate positions for each vote in the set of sixteen roll-call votes McDonald (1958) deemed the
most critical during the Convention. The author then (subjectively) decides whether a “yea” vote on
each measure represents a “pro-national” (coded “1”) or the reverse (coded “0”), enabling the
pooling of the resulting positions. McGuire (1984) uses this method in a pooled logit regression to
test whether certain economic interests were significantly related to delegates supporting the
formation of a stronger central government than other interests. In 1986, McGuire et al conduct a
similar study, but augment any missing individual delegate positions with imputations based on
attendance records under the assumption that a man would have voted “pro-national” if he signed
the finished Constitution. McGuire again in a 2003 book fleshes out a theoretical model of voting
behavior that he tests using these sixteen votes again along the “pro-national” axis. Finally, in 2007,
Heckelman et al provide a check on the natural monopoly McGuire had held in the “marketplace of
ideas” of empirical models of delegate voting behavior by directly reviewing McGuire’s methods and
testing his hypotheses using slightly different observations of delegate votes or definitions of their
characteristic covariates. This study confirmed previous findings that personal interests were
important in voting during the Convention, but that the influence of constituent interests had been
overstated by previous literature. In 2008 Dougherty et al again take a few votes and compress them
into a binary to measure how interests manifest, but instead with a specific eye towards votes
concerning slavery.
The results of these studies give statistical support to the notion that economic interests did
manifest in voting at the Convention. Findings regarding the significance of specific variables
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certainly inform my choices as to which covariates are relevant to my model. However, these studies
all carry the two inherent and fundamental flaws that I attempt to avoid in creating the dependent
variable here. First, the alignment of votes along a content-based axis such as “pro-national” or
“pro-slavery” is subjective in nature. It assumes that there is just one central dichotomy that the
Convention is “about,” an issue myriad political scholars and a few empirical researchers have
consistently failed to resolve. While the “pro-national” distinction certainly did apply to many votes
and does address a real and contentious issue during the Convention, these works give that line of
thought an inappropriately large amount of weight. Additionally, using only a few votes—16 out of
620 is a small fraction—poses great risk to meaningful statistical inference. Many studies rely on the
same sample of 16 votes, risking missing information that this sample may not capture.
In 2013, Heckelman and Dougherty harnessed the power of a new and exhaustive dataset of
delegate inferences to break away from the earlier technique and created a spatial model of delegate
voting throughout the Convention—calculating how closely any two delegates voted to each other
and thus creating a spatial “map” of Convention voting. In analyzing the proximities of delegate
votes, the work here allows for the concurrent analysis of many roll-call votes without obscuring the
raw data. While this method addresses the two central flaws of the technique that aligned a small
subset of votes around a single axis, it does not lend itself quite as well to analysis of the impact of
economic interests as covariates as a logistic regression. To color in their analysis with delegatespecific data, then, these authors compare the spatial mapping results with the historical data on
delegate characteristics to look for patterns. Several variables emerged as significantly related to the
relative positions of the delegates.
The utilization of spatial modeling to analyze the delegates to the Convention supports my
choice in dependent variable because both consider the similarity and dissimilarity of delegate votes
as a valid metric by which to measure some trend or pattern. In a sense, by measuring whether a
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delegate deviated from his state’s majority on any vote, I am performing a two-factor spatial analysis
for every observation. Both the spatial modeling technique and my own circumvent the issue
inherent in classifying votes on a preconceived scale when there is no consensus on what that scale
should be. Additionally, a delegate’s choice of deviating from his state’s majority is both concrete
and one he himself would perceive. Heckelman (2013) point out another flaw in classifying votes on
a preconceived scale: that “the delegates must perceive the underlying dimension to be the same as
the one identified by the researcher in order for the scale to be accurate.” While “How will my
decision affect the balance of power between the states and the central government” certainly went
through the mind of every delegate to the Convention at some point, no researcher can claim that
that thought always took forefront for every delegate for every vote. However, a delegate would
know how his voice would fall within his own delegation. Legal appointment and situational
solidarity tied together the men of each delegation, and the delegates discussed their positions within
their delegation before casting votes. While the actions of the rest of his delegations was not a
delegate’s only consideration when voting, certainly he perceived his place within the group for
every vote.
The binary variable (denoted state_dev) that indicates whether a delegate deviated from his state’s
majority on each vote is also strong because it allows me to use every substantive vote in the
Convention without convoluting the content of the data. The data on individual delegate positions,
which I describe in great detail in Section 6, gives only 20% of all potential individual positions
(5,121 out of the 25,928 Dougherty et al (2012) estimate existed overall), due to the practical
impossibility of knowing historical facts that primary sources do not give. Comparing a delegate’s
position to that of his state allows use of close to the full set of 5,121 delegate position observations
(there are 251 cases in which the authors have inferred a delegate’s position, but not that of his state,
bringing our number of total observations to 4,870). While this is still far fewer than the total
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number of individual delegate votes that must have been cast, I argue that this set is close to
complete in capturing significant instances of delegate dissensions: When the basis for the data is
primary source records that is notes taken by the delegates, it follows that the available information
is biased towards events that are somehow noteworthy, in the literal sense of the word. A delegate’s
deviating from his state majority certainly falls into this category.
The question of why a delegate would deviate from his state’s majority is crucial to using the
state_dev dependent variable for meaningful inference. The theoretical model of voting behavior
developed by McGuire (2003) leads into this explanation. He models a delegate’s choice of position
on any given roll-call—“yea” or “nay”—as a utility function of two general categories: Personal
Interests and Constituent Interests, as represented by vectors 𝑃𝑗 and 𝐶 𝑘 . He considers Personal
Interests as the ideas and experiences held by each individual delegate, and Constituent Interests the
general wants of the people of that delegate’s state. So, for delegate j, issue i, and state k, a delegate’s
vote V is given by:
𝑗𝑘

𝑉 𝑖 = 𝑔(𝑃𝑗 , 𝐶 𝑘 )

(1)

Under this framework, the event of a delegate’s deviating from his state’s majority position would
represent an occurrence of the Personal Interests outstripping the Constituent. If these are the two
factors that go into a vote, and a delegate does not vote with his state, then there must be some
personal interest at play, for in all other ways he and his fellow state delegates are identical.
A caveat regarding language: The terms “Personal” and “Constituent” are derived from
McGuire’s model, and are better understood as the “delegate-specific” and the “state-wide”
interests, to address whether they pertain to a characteristic that varies by the delegate or by the
state. McGuire’s terminology is misleading for the purposes of this paper for two reasons: Firstly,
the term “Constituent” is inappropriate here because it implies that the delegates are electorally
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accountable for their actions, which they were not—their presence at the Convention was by
appointment, not election. Additionally, these more technical labels allow more breathing room for
the potential scope of the covariate characteristics to influence a delegate’s decision to deviate or
not: For example, a delegate-specific characteristic such as his religion might influence him to
construe the interests of the people of his state differently than the rest of his delegation, causing
him to vote against them. In this scenario, he still would be acting out of a delegate-specific interest,
even if it was applied to his constituency.
Under this understanding of the place of state_dev in the theoretical model, using delegate
deviations as a measure of delegate-specific economic interests is appropriate and meaningful. As I
describe the importance of accounting for the model’s temporal dimension in the next section, I also
outline how a delegate’s deviation, as it is understood here, and the Great Compromise, are fitting
partners in an empirical model.

4.2

A Two-Period Analysis

The Great Compromise was the decision that settled how each state would be represented in the
Legislative Branch. An issue of incredible controversy from the Convention’s outset, its resolution
imparted to each delegate the knowledge of where his state would one day stand in the legislative
hierarchy of the new government. Delegates from smaller states could hope for as much as one
thirteenth of the new Legislature, and feared the potential of a negligibly small fraction, if the larger
states should succeed. On the other side of the debate, the delegates from the larger states were
eager for as much legislative power as the Convention would allow.
My hypothesis rests on the same assumption that Beard introduces, and that the rest of the
empirical literature consistently supports—that economic interests were significant in the
Philadelphia debates. From here, I hypothesize that the manifestation of these economic interests
was not constant throughout the Convention. Further, I posit that this fluctuation was a function of
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how those interests were related to the content of the deliberation in question. Specifically, I
hypothesize that the resolution of the Great Compromise impacted the information condition at the
Convention to the extent that the relationship between delegate economic interests and delegate
voting would also change across the two periods. In this section, I first describe the literature
supporting the outlook on voting at the Convention as a phenomenon that was not fixed over its
course. I then outline the specific way I hypothesize the economic interests of the delegates would
change with the Compromise.
The Nonfixed Nature of the Relationship Between a Delegate’s Voting and his Economic Interests
The authors that incorporate a time dimension into their projects studying voting behavior
(Jillison (1978, 1981, 1984) and Pope (2011)) inherently suggest a relationship between time and
economic interests. Notably for this research, all of these authors also identify the Great
Compromise as a notable event in their empirical work. Jillison et al (1984) speak to why a delegate’s
economic interest might vary over time. They suggest that in order for a person to strategically
manipulate a system to their own benefit, it is first necessary to understand to some degree what
shape that system will take. Specifically, they illustrate how the personal interests of the delegates
fluctuated in manifested impact throughout the Convention, by positing a difference between two
types of decisions: those regarding structural issues in the new government and those that regard the
more operational matters. For example, establishing how power would balance between the three
branches of government is a structural decision, while deciding how old a person must be before
running for President would occur on the operational level. Through a factor analysis of roll call
votes that divided the Convention into five periods, as well as a qualitative analysis of the content of
discussions, these authors concluded that the “material” (practical politics or economic) interests
more manifested at the “operational” level, while the “rational” (ideas and political principles)
interests influenced discussion at the structural level. These authors conclude that “some measure of
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detachment was possible at the ‘higher’ level of constitutional choice because the debates over
general principles provided little indication of precisely how the choice of one set of principles over
another would affect the specific interests of particular individuals, states, or regions.” These
conclusions relate to the hypothesis regarding the Great Compromise’s impact on how personal
economic interests manifest in voting at the Convention because they speak to how the expression
of a delegate’s economic interests are not necessarily fixed but are instead dependent on his
perception of how that vote would fall into the context of the Convention at that moment.
Other empirical work supports the second underlying part of my hypothesis—that a delegate’s
voting based on his economic interests changes with the proceedings of the Convention. While
studies using only a small subset of votes are ill-equipped to encompass the full breadth of the
Convention debates, they do reveal telling information about those particular votes. McGuire (1986)
found that “…personal and constituent interests affected voting behavior on particular issues
primarily when the interests could be significantly advanced by the outcome.”
These two pieces—that the impact of economic interests on voting varied over the course of the
convention, and that the variance was in reaction to the content of the debates—taken together
support the theory and intuition behind my specific hypothesis: that a delegate’s likelihood to
deviate from his state’s majority changes with the Great Compromise.
The Great Compromise Hypothesis
The direction I expect the change in voting patterns after the Great Compromise to take is
ambiguous. In describing the theoretical model in Equation 1, I identify how a delegate deviating
can be taken as his voting out of personal, rather than constituent, interest. However, it is not clear
whether the circumstances would indicate a delegate being more likely, or less likely, to vote out of
his personal interest after the Great Compromise than before. Another obfuscating caveat lies in the
difference between the theoretical model and what one would observe in voting at the Convention:
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The model in Equation 1 identifies delegate deviation as an observation of his voting by some
characteristic he does not share with the other members of his delegation—here cast as voting out
of his economic interest. This interpretation does not address that a delegate voting with his state
majority also could represent strategic voting, motivated by economic interests. As Jillison et al
(1978) empirically show through a factor analysis of state voting blocs, in the lead-up to the Great
Compromise the states as units were strategic players that formed alliances with each other based on
common interests or quid-pro-quos. As each vied for power in the legislative branch—its main
outlet for hopes of dominance (as compared to the Executive or Judicial)—the decision of the
individual to deviate or acquiesce bore more weight, for in those instances, a delegate had to take
into consideration the place of his state amidst a web of alliances. For example, a delegate might
vote with his state in order to support a voting bloc he thought would benefit his state, even if that
decision itself countered his own economic interest.
Contending stories could explain a delegate being both more and less likely to deviate before and
after the Great Compromise, while remaining within the theoretical model. After the Compromise
was made, a delegate might perceive less importance in voting in solidarity with his state’s
delegation, and be more likely to vote to his own interest. On the other hand, in line with Jillison
(1984), certainty with regard to future legislative representation would create an environment with
more opportunity for leveraging any particular economic interest, incentivizing a delegate to vote
accordingly. Discerning voting patterns is convoluted still further by the reality that each of these
two explanations could describe the actions of two different delegates voting on the same issue on
the same day. The problem is complicated still further by the Great Compromise’s deeply
intertwined place in many other debates on the floor. For example, the Convention settled on a twothirds majority of both houses of Congress as the required margin to override a Presidential veto.
With only thirteen states in the union at the time, a coalition of small states could overpower the
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President, but the feasibility of this would depend on how the delegates apportioned the legislative
branch. As another example, the distribution of votes in the Electoral College stemmed directly
from the Great Compromise.
For these reasons, I do not hypothesize a uniformly positive or negative impact of economic
interests on the probability delegate deviation as modelled before or after the Great Compromise.
The difficulty in a prediction speaks to the crucial nature of the issue of legislative apportionment in
the debates, and illustrates why the Convention almost broke apart several times in the leadup to the
Great Compromise.

5 Theoretical Considerations
I am using a delegate’s observed deviation or acquiescence to his state’s majority in each vote as an
indication of the relative impact of personal economic and noneconomic interests in two periods
modelled around the Great Compromise. For example, if a delegate’s vote is contrary to the vote
cast to the convention by his state overall, this indicates that some factor unique to that delegate
overrode the interests he shares with his fellow state delegates for that vote. I model the delegate’s
choice as the decision to vote with the majority, or independently. So, for delegate j, issue i, and state
k, a delegate’s decision of acquiescence or otherwise is given by:
𝑗𝑘

𝑌𝑖

= 𝑔(𝑃𝐸 𝑗 , 𝑃𝐼 𝑗 , 𝑃𝐸 𝑗 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡, 𝐶 𝑘 )

(2)

where PEj are the delegate-specific factors that are economic in nature, PIj are the delegate-specific
factors that are noneconomic in nature, post refers to the period after the Compromise, and C k are
the state-level or regional controls. I am looking to test if the same empirical model predicts voting
behavior throughout the Convention, specifically, in the period before and after the resolution of
the Great Compromise on July 16th, 1787. I hypothesize significant coefficients in the PE j and
PEj*post set.
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6 Data
Two datasets inform the empirical testing in my research. One describes voting during the
Convention, and I use these data to construct the dependent variable of a logistic regression model,
as well as two controls—“size” and “even”—for structural elements of the delegations. The second
dataset describes the delegates and the states. It informs the economic, noneconomic, and regional
control covariates in the logistic model.

6.1

CCRG Dataset5

Out of 797 total roll-call votes during the 1787 Constitutional Convention, Dougherty et al
(2012) in compiling this dataset identify 620 that are substantive (non-procedural) and give state and
delegate positions for each. Two primary sources are the dominant ultimate informants of the
project: the official Convention journal, kept by Secretary William Samuel Jackson of South Carolina
(who did not vote), and James Madison’s notes. Madison’s notes are a much more descriptive source
of the content of the debates than the Journal, which gives little more than the question at hand and
a tally of state positions. These sources, as well as the intermittent records kept by other delegates
such as Alexander Hamilton and Rufus King are compiled in the comprehensive resource The
Records of the Federal Convention (Farrand (1911)).

6.1.1 State Position Data
The process of collecting state votes was relatively straightforward, given that Secretary Jackson
reported each of the twelve6 attending states’ positions— “yea,” “nay,” or “divided,” on almost all of
the 620 roll-calls. Missing state votes are primarily due to attendance, for a state’s position on a day it
did not attend or did not reach a quorum is of course impossible to ascertain. Notably, no more
than eleven states ever simultaneously attended the Convention with quorum (New Hampshire and

5
6

Source: Constitutional Convention Research Group (CCRG) Website
Rhode Island did not attend the 1787 Convention by its own truculent choice.
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New York never held overlapping quorum). The challenges to empirical inference presented by the
general state attendance patterns are unavoidable and thus common to all analyses of the
Convention.
In the context of this specific two-period analysis, New York and New Hampshire’s
noncongruent attendances present special difficulty, because New York only voted before the Great
Compromise, and New Hampshire only afterwards. Given these facts, does using observations of
the New Hampshire or New York delegates deviating from their state majority make sense in a twoperiod analysis surrounding the Compromise? I argue that it still does. Consider any New York
delegate, on the floor of the Convention in its nascent weeks. He does not know what the future
days of the Convention will hold, what the future legislature will look like, or that his state will soon
be without quorum. His choice to deviate or not is the same as any other delegate during that time
period. In the other case, the two men from New Hampshire entered a meeting grown to teenage,
and so had no choice but to take its status as it stood. Specifically, all the decisions made by the New
Hampshire delegation were accompanied by the knowledge that in the First Congress, it would have
two Senators and three Congressmen, that all of the other states would have two Senators, and that
it would stand above Rhode Island and Delaware, equal to Georgia, and below the rest in terms of
Congressmen. Examining how economic interests manifest under these information conditions
should not depend on whether the state was present for the Great Compromise vote itself, only on
how its delegates acted on subsequent decisions.
Not all of the missing state positions in the CCRG dataset are due to absenteeism. Sometimes,
an irregular human error of Secretary Jackson’s resulted in his failure to record the position of a state
on a day it attended. There are other examples of an inconsistency in the recorded vote of a state
between the Journal and the records of Madison or some other delegate. In these cases, Dougherty
et al either correct for the error, if such a remedy is obvious, or else omit a state’s position for that
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particular vote. In the few occurrences of a state’s deliberately not voting, the authors do not record
any position for that state7. Lastly, there are 51 substantive votes that Secretary Jackson did not
number or list in the Journal. Generally, these are unanimous or close to unanimous decisions and
so are not numbered presumably because Jackson did not think it worthwhile to tally state votes
here. Often, Madison’s Notes give information on these issues that the official Journal glosses over.
Dougherty et al are extremely conservative in their inference in cases such as this, by not recording
the position of a state unless it is explicitly given by some record.

6.1.2 Delegate Inferences in CCRG Dataset
Compared to documenting the state positions, ascertaining the positions of the individual
delegates required much more time and thoughtfulness on the part of Dougherty et al (2012). This
process involved three steps. First, the authors accounted for delegations of one or two—for these
votes, a delegate’s position must8 have matched that of his state. The authors consider inferences
made with this first step as “known”. Next, Dougherty et al. inferred the positions of the votes a
delegate spoke to directly during the convention, and on the day the vote was cast, as indicated in the
Journal, Madison’s Notes, or some other record. Lastly, these authors compared inferences drawn in
the second step to the majority vote of that state, to deduce how the remaining delegates of that
state must have voted. For example, in a three-person delegation, two delegates must have voted
together if the vote of the third is known and opposite of that recorded for the state overall.
While the label “inferences” to describe the process of collecting the votes of the individual
delegates may imply a certain amount of guesswork or imputation of the data, the authors were
extraordinarily careful and logical in their choices to the extent that no position of an individual

For example, on the first vote regarding Legislative Apportionment, NJ did not vote because its governor explicitly
forbid it from voting against equality of state representation in the Legislature, and the delegation had not yet
established a strategy for navigating this problem.
8 The exception to this “must” is if a two-man delegation reported a “divided” vote. The authors examined these
cases in the next steps of the inference process.
7
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delegate given is not grounded in hard historical evidence. In their description of the inference
process, Dougherty et al err on the side of no inference in the cases that primary sources seem
unable to settle definitively. Additionally, the authors formally tested the validity of the main
assumption of the three-step inference process: the second step turned on the assumption that a
delegate’s statement always aligned with how he actually voted. Using the 61 observations for which
a delegate’s vote was known by step one, and he also made a statement, the authors tested their
assumption by checking whether these two pieces of information matched. In all but two rather
idiosyncratic cases, a delegate’s vote matched his statement of intent—a result supportive of the
validity of the individual delegate inferences given by the CCRG dataset.
An issue presented by this process is that the data on individual delegate’s positions are more
likely to refer to delegates from states with smaller delegations. I attempt to address this issue by
controlling for delegation size in all specifications.
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6.1.3 Creating Dependent Variable and Structural Controls
Dependent Variable: state_dev
Figure 1: Distribution of delegate deviation from state majority across all roll calls

Table 1: Distribution of Delegate Deviation from State Majority, by state
State

NH

GA

NJ

NY

NC

MD

DE

CT

MA

PA

SC

VA

TOTAL

State_dev =1

0

1

3

14

18

23

33

19

105

89

101

121

527

746

918

53

91

140

288

97

682

326

311

269

422

4,343

746

919

56

105

158

311

130

701

431

400

370

543

4,870

=0
Total Obs.

Figure 1 charts the number of delegate deviations across each roll-call vote. While the number of
deviations is symmetric, this figure brings to light the place of the Great Compromise among the
votes during the Convention: While it occurred almost exactly halfway through the Convention in
terms of time, about two-thirds of the total votes cast occurred after the Compromise. An
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examination of the records explains such an imbalance: During the first half of the Convention,
debates were longer, and votes were subsequently fewer and further between. As the Convention
reached its close, and the delegates prepared to sign the finished document, the sheer number of
votes increased in order to bring the meeting to its resolution. Since I am not interested in the
overall likelihood of delegate deviation, but rather how the economic interests impacted the
probability of delegate deviation, the even distribution of state_dev supports the potential for the
following specifications to address patterns of interests, rather than some other concurrent
phenomenon.
Table 1 tabulates delegate deviation by states. Clearly, the distribution of dissentions across
states is not as symmetric as it is across time or state. Notably, there are no observations for
delegates from New Hampshire voting contrary to their state’s position, only one for Georgia, and
only three for New Jersey. A strong sense of camaraderie amongst a delegation, an absence of
voicing dissention, or some bias in Madison’s records could all serve as possible explanations for
these low occurrences. That Virginia has the highest number of recorded delegate deviations from
the state majority is not surprising, given that Madison (a Virginian) is the source of most of the
delegate positions, and he would have been sure to record if his delegation acted in a manner he
himself did not see fit. While this lack of a uniform distribution of dissentions across states is not
ideal, note that states big and small, as well as north and south are all represented among the
delegations for which we do have more observations of a delegate’s deviation. As I will outline
shortly, these distinctions are of interest in the empirical model, and so the demonstrated data to
those characteristics displayed here allows us to continue with this estimation strategy.
Structural Controls: size, even
Using the CCRG dataset, I construct two controls used in all specifications that address
structural elements of each delegation with impact on delegate deviation. Larger delegations are
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more likely than smaller ones to house some deviation, simply by their larger size. The size control
measures the size of each delegation, specific to each vote. The two delegates who did not vote and
are thus omitted from analysis of voting behavior are factored into delegation attendance for the
short time that either did attend the Convention. The size of a delegation was not related to the
population of the constituent state—the legislature or governor of a state selected the men who
would represent it during the Convention, some of whom (for idiosyncratic reasons) never made it
to Philadelphia.
The occurrence of a divided state vote presents an issue in the state_dev dependent variable—
how can I measure deviation from the majority, in the 118 cases of a state failing to reach a
consensus? The tabulations above of observed deviations simply drop the divided cases, and use the
even control to compensate in the regression. A delegation of odd number cannot produce an even
split (if every member votes) and so the even control speaks to the divided case.

6.2

Descriptive Data

Professor Keith Dougherty of the University of Georgia provided a full range of descriptive data
for each of the fifty-five delegates to the Convention and for each of the twelve attending states.
Covariates in the model include several measures of a delegate’s potential economic interest and a
set of noneconomic contenders for factors influencing a delegate’s voting in Philadelphia. The focus
here is delegate voting behavior, and so I omit descriptive data for the two men that attended the
Convention and did not vote. Table 2 provides summary statistics and descriptions for these
variables, as well as the secondary source that provided me the information. Original sources of
these data are primary or historical sources (census data, biographies) employed by the author
indicated in the last column of Table 2. I describe some of these variables in more detail following
Table 2. No other author has examined voting through measuring delegate deviation, and so I
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selected the specific covariates to include by considering any sort of demonstrated empirical impact
on voting suggested by the author in the source column for each variable.
Table 2: Descriptions and Summary Statistics for Empirical Tests
Obs.

Mean

Std. Dev

Min

Max

Description

Num. of slaves
Priv. securities

53
53

32.35849
.2264151

61.36934
.4225158

0
0

300
1

Pub. Securities

53

.5471698

.5025335

0

1

Western land

53

.2264151

.4225158

0

1

Distance

53

16.39623

37.56653

0

200

Number of slaves owned by a delegate in 1790
Indicator for if the delegate owned any private
securities in 1787
Indicator for if the delegate owned any public
securities in 1787
Indicator for if the delegate owned western lands in
1787
Miles from the center of a delegate's home county in
1787 to nearest navigable water

Noneconomic Variables
Rev. War Officer

53

.3396226

.4781131

0

1

Hierarchical

53

.5849057

.4974536

0

1

Communitarian

53

.245283

.4343722

0

1

Age
Legislative

53
53

43.71698
7.566038

11.39564
6.172238

26
0

81
30

Executive

53

3.075472

7.065216

0

48

Judicial

53

3.45283

6.243662

0
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Deep South

53

.245283

.4343722

0

1

Indicator for if delegate is from GA, NC, or SC

New England

53

.1698113

.37906

0

1

South

53

.4528302

.5025335

0

1

Population
Population Squared

53
53

34.42777
16472.94

21.49505
19534.42

5.9096
349.233

82.1227
67441.38

Indicator for if if delegate is from CT, MA, or NH
Indicator for if delegate is from GA, NC, SC, VA,
or MD
Total population of each state in 1787, in ten
thousands
Total population of each state in 1787 squared, in
ten thousands

Roll Call Variables
State_dev

4,870

.1082136

.3106818

0

1

Equals 1 if delegate vote does not match state vote;
0 if delegate vote does match state vote

Post

4,870

.763849

.4247596

0

1

Equals 0 for votes 1-156, 1 for votes 156-620

Delegation Size1

4,870

3.392696

1.718573

1

8

Even

4,870

.7513336

.4322843

0

1

Number of delegates in attendance for each vote
Equals 1 if delegation size is an even number for
that vote, 0 if odd

Economic Variables

Indicator for if the delegate was an officer in the
Revolutionary War
Indicator for if the delegate is Catholic or
Episcopalian
Indicator for if the delegate is Congregationalist,
Deist, or Quaker
The age of the delegate in the summer of 1787
Number of years a delegate has held legislative
office at any level (no overlap)
Number of years a delegate has held executive office
at any level (no overlap)
Number of years judicial at any level (no overlap),
includes justice of the peace and attorney general

Source
McG
McG
McG
McG
McG

McG
H&D
H&D
H&D
H&D
H&D
H&D

Regional Controls
H&D
H&D
H&D
H&D
H&D

CCRG
CCRG
CCRG
CCRG

1In calculating delegate size, all 55 (rather than 53) delegates were used.

Source: Heckelman, Jac and Keith L. Dougherty 2013. "A Spatial Analysis of Delegate Voting at the Constitutional Convention,"
Journal of Economic History, 73(2): 407-44.
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Public and Private Securities: Public securities in the context of the Constitutional Convention were
debt instruments that many states issued during the Revolution. In the years following the War, the
patriotic (and wealthy) citizens who held these securities suffered losses when the newly freed states
did not always honor these securities at face value. Private securities were shares in private land
companies and canal and road development companies. The prospects of these companies directly
related to the development of the Western lands. Beard’s thesis rests heavily on the impact of these
securities on delegate voting at the Convention.
Western Land: Ownership of Western Land also proved an important asset in the era directly
foreshadowing “Manifest Destiny.” Jillison et al (1978) note that the “landed” versus “landless”
dichotomy held some explanatory power in the rearrangement of voting blocs in the period before
the Great Compromise.
Distance to Navigable Water: Considering the significant difficulty of travel during the 1780s, the
commercial interests of delegates representing more and less coastal eras plausibly differed greatly.
As the delegates deliberated issues such as the powers of Congress to regulate commerce tax
exports, the various commercial backgrounds of the delegates came into conflict. McGuire (1986)
derive the measure of distance from a delegate’s home to the nearest navigable coastline. The results
of this work found a relationship between distance to the Coast and the likelihood of voting pronationally that is significant and positive for some specific issues, significant and negative for others.
Hierarchical, Communitarian: The religion dummies in the Noneconomic Variable category are not
necessarily part of the same set: Three delegates—Clymer and Wilson of Pennsylvania and
Dickinson of Delaware—are both communitarian and hierarchical. Religions that are represented at
the Convention but that are not included in the communitarian and hierarchical dummies include:
Presbyterian, Lutheran, Dutch Reformist. Again, these data identify some delegates as one of these
three religions as well as either communitarian or hierarchical.
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7 Empirical Model
Let
𝑗𝑘

𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒_𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖 = 𝛽1 𝑿𝟏𝒋 + 𝛽2 𝑿𝟏𝒋 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑿𝟐𝒋 + 𝛽4 𝑿𝟑𝒌 + 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛 + 𝑢𝑖

(3)

Where state_devjki =1 if the vote of delegate j opposes the vote of his state k for issue i ; 0 otherwise
X1j=set of delegate-specific economic variables, for delegate j
X2j=set of noneconomic delegate specific variables, for delegate j
X3k=set of regional controls, by state k
post=1 if vote i is after the Great Compromise (vote 156); 0 otherwise
size=size of that delegate’s state delegation during each vote
even=1 if size is an even number, 0 if size is odd
ui = randomly distributed error term
I am testing the same model with five options for the set of regional controls X3k:
1. Regional: New England, Mid-Atlantic, Deep South (GA, NC, SC)
2. Regional: New England, Mid-Atlantic, South (GA, NC, SC, VA, MD)
3. Population Control (Total population in 1787, according to census)
4. Population, population squared
5. State fixed-effects
As the dependent variable is binary, I am using a logistic regression model to test these hypotheses:
Hypothesis A: 𝛽1 , 𝛽2 ≠0, indicating that economic interests generally impacted the probability of
delegate deviation throughout the Convention.
Hypothesis B: 𝛽1 ≠0, indicating that the impact of a change in economic interest on a delegate’s
probability of deviating from the majority position of his state is not the same before and after the
Great Compromise.

34

8 Results
Table 3: Logit Results of Delegate Deviations from their State Majority Positions
Dependent Variable: state_dev
Clustered Standard Errors by State
Structural
Controls Only

Regional
controls;
“South” as
GA, NC, SC

Regional
controls;
“South” as
GA, NC, SC,
VA, MD

Population
control

Population,
Population
squared
controls

State fixed
effects2

Economic Variables
Num. of slaves
Priv. securities
Pub. securities
Western land
Distance
Joint Significance (P-Values)

-0.000731

0.00257

0.000362

0.00234*

-0.00204

[0.00253]

[0.00311]

[0.00151]

[0.00177]

[0.00510]

-0.239

-0.313

-0.0410

-0.239

-0.373

[0.645]

[0.535]

[0.463]

[0.492]

[0.860]

0.548**

0.862***

0.993****

1.005****

0.550**

[0.426]

[0.349]

[0.314]

[0.288]

[0.301]

0.402

0.282

0.324

-0.0123

0.623*

[0.362]

[0.348]

[0.441]

[0.413]

[0.437]

0.00477

0.00393

0.00394

0.00293

-0.000267

[0.00766]

[0.00690]

[0.00705]

[0.00666]

[0.00546]

0.0001****

0.0001****

0.0000****

0.0000****

0.0062***

0.00546****

0.00503****

0.00407****

0.00348****

0.00366****

Post-G.C. Interactions
Num. of slaves

[0.00152]

[0.00141]

[0.00150]

[0.00129]

[0.00128]

Priv. securities

-0.354

-0.396

-0.402*

-0.202

-0.172

[0.433]

[0.428]

[0.397]

[0.404]

[0.239]

Pub. securities

-0.714*

-0.739*

-0.819****

-0.883**

-0.350

[0.541]

[0.564]

[0.490]

[0.517]

[0.407]

Western land

0.836***

0.873**

0.801**

0.738**

0.253

[0.417]

[0.454]

[0.463]

[0.399]

[0.368]

Distance

0.0278****

0.0224****

0.0179***

0.0238***

0.0192***

[0.00850]

[0.00674]

[0.00869]

[0.00925]

[0.00970]

Joint Significance (P-Values)

0.0000****

0.0000****

0.0000****

0.0008****

0.0006****

1.159***

1.171**

0.932**

1.342***

0.919****

[0.500]

[0.643]

[0.552]

[0.554]

[0.330]

1.488****

1.116****

1.225****

1.145****

1.033****

[0.364]

[0.250]

[0.344]

[0.338]

[0.345]

Noneconomic Variables
Rev. War Officer
Hierarchical
Communitarian
Age
Legislative Experience

-0.137

-0.239

0.0484

0.206

0.285

[0.324]

[0.297]

[0.454]

[0.487]

[0.313]

-0.0108

-0.00511

-0.00955

-0.00395

-0.0144***

[0.0134]

[0.0145]

[0.0118]

[0.0138]

[0.00587]

-0.000430

0.0129

0.0392

0.0381

-0.0475*

[0.0323]

[0.0302]

[0.0315]

[0.0344]

[0.0309]
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Executive Experience
Judicial Experience

0.0205

-0.000117

-0.00229

-0.0112

0.0412***

[0.0228]

[0.0197]

[0.0192]

[0.0198]

[0.0174]

0.0192

-0.0178

-0.0163

-0.00815

0.0494*

[0.0237]

[0.0160]

[0.0151]

[0.00884]

[0.0330]

0.0000****

0.0000****

0.0000****

0.0000****

0.0000****

0.358****

0.593****

0.502****

0.321****

0.285***

0.496**

[0.123]

[0.181]

[0.161]

[0.117]

[0.144]

[0.280]

-0.446

-0.448

-0.278

-0.271

-0.379

0.151

[0.412]

[0.356]

[0.300]

[0.253]

[0.353]

[0.286]

-0.353

-0.621

-0.655*

-0.439

-0.391

-0.323

[0.281]

[0.448]

[0.493]

[0.460]

[0.413]

[0.329]

.0022647

0.0934*

[.0118]

[0.07155]

Joint Significance (P-Values)
Structural Controls
Delegation Size
Even
Post
Deep South

1.080
[0.626]

New England

1.670

0.989*

[0.706]

[0.752]

South

-0.216
[0.852]

Population (ten thousand)
Population Squared

-.00009*
[.0000643]

State Fixed Effects3
Constant

****
-2.938

-6.112

-5.188

-4.551

-6.393

-4.857

[0.650]

[1.259]

[1.242]

[0.900]

[1.502]

[1.361]

Observations
4,870
4,870
4,870
4,870
4,870
3,205
*indicates significance at the 20% level; ** at the 10%; *** at the 5%; ****at the 1%
2Observations from NH and GA are dropped here, see above for explanation. Logit results for all models without NH, GA observations are presented
in the Appendix.

Hypothesis A:
Table 3 displays logistic regression results. The model regresses the economic interest variables
in two periods and the noneconomic interest variables in one on the dependent variable of delegate
deviation, for five methods of regional control. Across all specifications, the set of all economic
characteristics are jointly significant in either period, meaning that before and after the Great
Compromise, a delegate’s economic interests impacted the model’s prediction of his disagreeing
with the majority position of his state. The set of noneconomic characteristics (modelled uniformly
throughout the Convention) display joint significance consistent across all models, as well. These
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findings from joint significance tests are broad results supporting the general practice of examining
the voting patterns of the delegates as functions of their economic interests.
Hypothesis B:
The patterns of significance in Table 3 suggest the nature of the general influence of economic
interests posited by Hypothesis A. Three of the individual economic interest variables support
Hypothesis B by presenting significance (consistent across all five specifications) that is distinct
between the two periods. These economic interest variables are: the number of slaves a delegate
owns, the distance in miles from the center of his home county to navigable water, and the
ownership of public securities. Table 4 gives the average partial effects of these significant covariates
at meaningful values, corroborating the discussion of the nature and weight of each.
Holding all else equal, the more slaves a delegate owns, the greater his likelihood to deviate after
(and only after) the Compromise. While consistently significant, the marginal impact (reported in
Table 4) on a delegate’s probability of deviation of an increase in slaveholdings never surpasses even
half a percentage point, at any chosen point of evaluation.
Holding all else equal, the further from navigable water a delegate’s county of origin, the more
likely he is to deviate after (and only after) the Compromise. The same triviality of impact pertains to
an increase in miles from navigable water.
Holding all else equal, delegates who own public securities are more likely to deviate before (and
only before) the Compromise. The only economic variable that is at all significant before the
Compromise is the public securities indicator, which is significant and positive across all five
specifications. The lack of other significant results in the first section of Table 3 indicates that the
driver of the joint significance of economic interests before the Great Compromise is the public
securities dummy. Table 4 shows a marginal impact of public securities that is slightly more
interesting than the APEs of the other significant variables: The model predicts that delegates who
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own public securities are around 4% more likely to deviate from their delegation than those who do
not own these securities. While a 4% increase in probability exceeds a .005% increase, it still does
not serve as a comprehensive explanation for delegate deviation. Still, the consistent significance of
these three post-interacted variables, across all tested specifications, supports Hypothesis B.
Table 4: Average Partial Effects for Variables of Particular Interest
Dependent Variable: state_dev
Clustered Standard Errors by State

Economic Variables
Number of Slaves, Post:

=0
Min=6

1st quartile=53
2nd quartile = 80
Mean = 95.28
3rd quartile=101
Max=300
Distance, Post:

=0
Min=1
1st quartile=8
2nd quartile = 20
Mean = 41.38
3rd quartile=50
Max=200

Public Securities, Pre
Noneconomic Variables
Rev War Officer:

Regional controls;
“South” as GA,
NC, SC

Regional controls;
“South” as GA,
NC, SC, VA, MD

Population
control

Population,
Population
squared controls

State fixed effects

0.000245****
[0.0000877]
0.000253****
[0.0000915]
0.000317***
[0.000127]
0.000361***
[0.000153]
0.000387***
[0.000169]
0.000397***
[0.000176]
0.000882**
[0.000482]
0.00117****
[0.000326]
0.00120****
[0.000338]
0.00143****
[0.000442]
0.00191****
[0.000699]
0.00307***
[0.00144]
0.00365***
[0.00182]
0.00199
[0.00197]
0.037**
[0.0199]

0.000229****
[0.0000733]
0.000235****
[0.0000763]
0.000290****
[0.000104]
0.000326****
[0.000124]
0.000349***
[0.000137]
0.000357***
[0.000142]
0.000758**
[0.000391]
0.000978****
[0.000302]
0.000998****
[0.000312]
0.00115****
[0.000388]
0.00146****
[0.000559]
0.00216***
[0.00101]
0.00251***
[0.00124]
0.00346***
[0.00167]
0.0432***
[0.0191]

0.000213***
[0.0000862]
0.000218***
[0.0000892]
0.000258***
[0.000116]
0.000283***
[0.000134]
0.000299***
[0.000145]
0.000305***
[0.000150]
0.000564*
[0.000359]
0.000911**
[0.000478]
0.000925**
[0.000491]
0.00103**
[0.000593]
0.00124*
[0.000804]
0.00170*
[0.00130]
0.00192
[0.00155]
0.00395****
[0.000585]
0.0563***
[0.0233]

0.000159****
[0.0000609]
0.000162****
[0.0000628]
0.000187***
[0.0000797]
0.000203***
[0.0000912]
0.000213***
[0.0000982]
0.000216***
[0.000101]
0.000380*
[0.000235]
0.00100***
[0.000406]
0.00102***
[0.000420]
0.00119***
[0.000538]
0.00153**
[0.000805]
0.00232*
[0.00151]
0.00271*
[0.00187]
0.00316
[0.00262]
0.0490***
[0.0210]

0.000370****
[0.000117]
0.000377****
[0.000122]
0.000432****
[0.000161]
0.000466***
[0.000185]
0.000486***
[0.000200]
0.000493***
[0.000206]
0.000769**
[0.000401]
0.00211****
[0.000768]
0.00215****
[0.000800]
0.00242***
[0.00104]
0.00293**
[0.00152]
0.00393*
[0.00246]
0.00433*
[0.00280]
0.00182
[0.00204]
0.0511*
[0.0346]

0 to 1

0.0579***
0.0586**
0.0528*
0.0655***
0.0909****
[0.0281]
[0.0351]
[0.0326]
[0.0272]
[0.0349]
Hierarchical:
0 to 1
0.0743****
0.0559****
0.0694****
0.0559****
0.107****
[0.0171]
[0.0123]
[0.0237]
[0.0212]
[0.0365]
*indicates significance at the 20% level; ** at the 10%; *** at the 5%; ****at the 1%
Quartiles calculated among observations of a characteristic’s presence; ie. the average number of slaves owned among delegates who owned slaves is 95.28

While a cursory look at Table 3 supports Hypotheses A and B, the Average Partial Effects given
in Table 4 impede substantive conclusions regarding the impact of economic interests on delegate
deviation, and the existence of concrete changes in voting patterns with the decision of the Great
Compromise. Table 5 summarizes the fitted values for each specification and provides a context for
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evaluating the importance of the APEs in Table 4. None of the APEs for the economic interests
verge matching a standard deviation in either group (actual observed deviation or assent) listed.
However, Table 5 also provides detail on the predicted probabilities made by the model. The
range of all predictions made by the model provides a for evaluating the importance of the
seemingly small marginal effects reported in Table 5: The highest probability of deviation across all
specifications is 65.5%; the lowest is 0.4%, and averages (among all observations) range from 13.2%
to 16.4%. These narrow ranges bolster the relative impact of a seemingly small APE. Table 6 also
reveals how the minimum and maximum predicated probabilities are almost identical between the
observations of actual deviation and otherwise (across all models). Consider the pair of
observations—one of a delegate deviating, one of a delegate voting with his state’s majority—that
the model controlling for population and its quadratic gave the fitted values of 2.2% and 3.2%,
respectively. Given actual events, the 2.2% prediction is not surprising, while the 3.2% prediction
seems out of place. So, a slight marginal impact has more potential for an actual effect on the
predicted outcome when the difference between deviation and acquiescence in the model is also
small.
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Table 5: Fitted Value Summaries Across All Specifications
Observations1
Observed
state_dev
Fitted Value
Summaries
Regional
controls;
“South” as
GA, NC, SC
Regional
controls;
“South” as
GA, NC,
SC, VA, MD
Population
control
Population,
Population
squared
controls

Mean
=0

=1

Standard Deviation
All

=0

=1

All

Minimum Value
=0

=1

All

Maximum Value

=0

=1

All

=0

=1

All

4,337

524

4,861

0.120

0.235

0.132

0.094

0.106

0.102

0.012

0.017

0.012

0.628

0.628

0.628

4,337

524

4,861

0.130

0.234

0.138

0.098

0.099

0.103

0.018

0.024

0.018

0.655

0.651

0.651

4,337

524

4,861

0.136

0.228

0.146

0.085

0.096

0.091

0.025

0.033

0.025

0.585

0.585

0.585

4,337

524

4,861

0.126

0.228

0.137

0.088

0.098

0.095

0.022

0.032

0.022

0.587

0.587

0.587

State fixed
2,673 523 3,196
0.145 0.257 0.164
0.116 0.119 0.124 0.004 0.012 0.004
0.563 0.563 0.563
effects
1These summary statistics do not include the nine observations for Alexander Martin of New Jersey, a consistent outlier and maximum. No values
changed meaningfully by his omission, except for the maximum.

The differences in significance and magnitude of impact visible between the five given
specifications also renders information regarding the driving forces at play. Specifically, in Table 3
the Western Land ownership dummy is significant in all specifications except for the state fixed
effects model. Given the specific distribution of observed delegate deviation across the twelve states,
the state fixed effects method required estimation without any observations from New Hampshire
or Georgia. Table A.1 in the Appendix gives logistic results for the same specifications tested in
Table 3, but with observations from the same ten states for all methods of estimation. Without
Georgia or New Hampshire, the ownership of Western land (before and after) is not significant in
any model. Table 6 lists the delegates who owned Western land at the time of the Convention. None
of these men represented either Georgia or New Hampshire, explaining why eliminating these two
states significantly changed the place of Western land holdings in all specifications. Omitting data on
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delegates from New Hampshire and Georgia did not impact the significance of any of the other
variables displaying statistical importance in Table 3.
Table 6: Western Land Holdings by Delegate, State
Delegate

State

Blount

Dayton

Fitzsimons

Franklin

Gerry

Gorham

Lansing

Mason

Morris

Washington

Williamson

Wilson

NC

NJ

PA

PA

MA

MA

NY

VA

PA

VA

NC

PA

Under the two specifications controlling for state population, the impact of owning public
securities is not the same as the other models—with population or population and population
squared controls, public security ownership (both before and after the Great Compromise) is a
much more significant component. Table 7 orders the states by their population, and tabulates
public security ownership in each. The table shows that the delegations representing states larger in
population are more diverse with regards to public security ownership. Additionally, the larger states
of Virginia, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania are neighbors in terms of population rankings, but not
geographically. The combination of these two details helps explain why public security ownership
appears as more important in models that account for the population size of the states.
Table 7: Public Security Ownership by State
State
Population (ten thousands)
# delegates owning public securities
# delegates not owning public securities

DE
5.9
5
0

GA
8.2
3
1

NH
14.2
1
0

NJ
18.4
4
0

CT
23.8
3
0

SC
24.9
4
0

MD
32.0
5
0

NY
34.0
2
1

NC
39.5
5
0

PA
43.4
2
6

MA
47.5
3
1

VA
82.1
4
2

Other Findings
While not directly related to the main hypothesis concerning the interplay of delegate economic
interests and the Great Compromise, the logit regressions in Table 3 give information on other
variables affecting delegate deviation. Across all specifications, former Revolutionary War officers
were more likely to deviate from their delegation’s majority than other delegates, holding all else
equal. Table 4 shows the magnitude of the effect to be over five percent—a greater impact on the
sheer probability than the model estimated for any of the economic characteristics.
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Delegates ascribing to a hierarchical (Catholic, Episcopalian) religion were more likely to deviate
from their delegation’s majority position than delegates of all other religions, holding all else equal.
As with the impact of officer status, the weight of the impact of practicing a hierarchical religion on
deviation outstrips that of the economic interests (in any period) that were the focus of the
hypotheses here—Table 4 shows an impact of between 5.6% and 10.7% for this characteristic.
Especially within the context provided by Table 5, participation in a hierarchical religion seems to
have made a non-negligible impact on voting during the Convention.

9 Discussion
The findings supporting Hypothesis A speak to the dozens of projects since Beard that look to
decipher if and how the economic interests of the Founders affected their voting during the
Convention. The most general mission of this paper was to add one more perspective to the
literature of economic interpretations of the Constitution. No previous author—empirical or
otherwise—focused as I have done on delegate deviation from the majority. The finding that
economic interests mattered during the convention is consistent with the results in the recent
empirical literature, and reaching this end through different empirical means corroborates the point
other authors (most prominently: McGuire, Ohsfeldt, Heckelman, Dougherty) have made. The fact
that the state_dev dependent variable produced results consistent to the literature, and (I argue) is a
more comprehensive and subjective measure of votes than others used, suggests that the
development of this tool also could serve future projects looking to understand the Convention.
While the logistic regression model found statistical support for Hypothesis B, the actual
magnitude of these results is slight. Several factors limit the potential scope of this model. First, the
available data is unavoidably limited by its primary source nature—the information recorded by
James Madison cannot grow with time. An issue with potential resolution on the part of researchers
is the convoluted nature of these debates. McGuire (1984) point out how logrolling and vote trading
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would obscure the effects of voting out of economic interests, because these activities would result
in a delegate voting counter to how he otherwise would. The same logic applies here: There are
many aspects of the Convention that are inherently impossible to address at an empirical level. As a
result, gauging exactly the impact of any economic interest is impossible.
The Compromise was a decision that had everything to do with powers of the states in the
federal government. As these results help to discern, the debates surrounding the Compromise are
entangled with other decisions facing the delegates. As one example, in discussing proportional
representation, the delegates also needed to discuss how state populations would be counted. From
these debates we have clauses in the Constitution regarding a census, as well as the 3/5 compromise,
which held that slaves would count for 3/5 of a person for the purposes of taxation and
representation. This description may shed light on the story behind the significance of the number
of slaves variable, after the Compromise.
The significance of the public securities indicator supports Beard’s general hypothesis. Beard
held that delegates holding public securities were more likely to favor a strong federal government.
Results here show that public security holders were more likely to vote contrary to their state before
the Great Compromise, suggesting that speaking to this interest was perceived as more important in
the period of determining legislative apportionment—perhaps when the shape the nation would take
was a more unknown quantity (that could potentially favor public security holders).
The distance variable’s positive significance after the Great Compromise may speak to another
controversial and concurrent debate. Jillison et al (1981) define the Commerce and Slave Trade
Compromise (Vote 352) as the next truly pivotal decision following the Great Compromise. This
Compromise resulted in Congress’s prohibition on banning the Slave Trade until 1800, in exchange
for shipping privileges (coveted by Northern commercial states). The particularities of this
compromise are heavily affected by the Great Compromise (as much as any deal based on the
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powers of Congress, since the Great Compromise determined which states would have power in
Congress). Since the Commerce and Slave Trade Compromise came after the Great Compromise,
the significance of distance in the post-G.C. period must be taken with this other event in mind.

10 Conclusions
Contemporary rhetoric frequently alludes to the motivations of the Founding Fathers, but the
Constitution was born in a wholly different era: one in which the majority of the population lived on
farms, in which a person rarely touched paper currency, and, most significantly, one in which entire
economies rested on the backs of enslaved human beings. The antiquated language of the
Constitution may suggest that it was a product of its day, but the injustices ingrained in the text
substantively show the society from which it emerged. While the Convention succeeded in the sense
that the United States’ is the longest-lasting written Constitution in history, the Convention itself is a
telling and incredibly consequential manifestation of issues such as race that are deeply entrenched in
the political and economic history of this country. These fifty-five men met for only four months,
but during that time they managed to reconcile the interests of twelve sovereign states into one
union. While the Constitution certainly is not a product of one mind or one set of interests alone,
nor is it the product of some objective force juxtaposing the philosophical underpinnings of the
Enlightenment.
The empirical work here builds off of that of other authors who have studied exactly how the
interests each delegate brought with him to the Convention appeared in this document. In modeling
the course of the Convention in two periods around the decision of the Great Compromise, this
research allows us to see exactly how the informational environment around a delegate affects how
he sees the place of himself and his own interests during the Convention. Three personal economic
characteristics: the number of slaves owned, the distance from a delegate’s home county to navigable
water, and his ownership of public securities significantly impacted a delegate’s probability of
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deviating from his state’s majority in a distinct way in the two periods divided by the Compromise.
These results suggest the interplay explored by Pope and Treier (2011) between the Great
Compromise and other issues explored contemporary to it at the Convention. In line with recent
scholarship on the Constitution, then, these results uphold the standing that the Constitution of the
United States can be seen as an economic document, and in part exists as a quilt of the interests and
experiences of the Founders.
Results here are slight and subtle, but the question posed is also intricate, and the dependent
variable is an indirect method of measuring the manifestation of economic interests. Additionally, it
is appropriate to reiterate in my concluding remarks that while economic interests seem to be
powerful influencers in the creation of the Constitution, and acknowledgement of their impact on
the origins of the U.S. government is important, these were not the only forces at play that summer
in Philadelphia. Enlightenment philosophy, political theory, and unrecorded quid-pro-quos made at
the Indian Queen tavern the night after a long debate certainly spoke their words, as well, in creating
this “Supreme Law of the Land.” In the context of a convoluted and complicated meeting, the
economic interests that do shine through are empirically even more interesting and robust. The
trends here align with historic accounts of the convention, as seen in the description of how the
significant economic characteristics and the Great Compromise were logically related. Results here
still indicate that delegates were hedging some of their economic interests on the political structures
that they were creating for themselves as well as the other Americans—alive then or not yet—who
did not have the privilege of a voice in the ratification of the Constitution.
And so, the Constitution and the Constitutional Convention should serve as both inspiration
and warning for America of 2019: If fifty-five men of so staunchly idiosyncratic opinion could arrive
at a consensus of such monumental scope in 1787, why is the recent Congress so unable to
compromise on its yearly budget that a government shutdown is albeit route? A potential answer
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embodies the converse: How can a system created by a few wealthy white men truly persist in a
nation whose current existence is the product of 232 years of straining against that very entity? The
results here do not contain the answers to these questions, but in striving to understand a specific
facet of the Convention, I hope to contribute to the general understanding of the United States as a
system and a society.
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Appendix
A.1Logit Results of Delegate Deviations from their State Majority Positions,
NH, GA dropped
Dependent Variable: state_dev
Clustered Standard Errors by State
Structural
Controls Only

Regional
controls;
“South” as
NC, SC

Regional
controls;
“South” as
NC, SC, VA,
MD

Population
control

Population,
Population
squared
controls

State fixed
effects2

0.00167

0.00426*

0.00300***

0.00319***

-0.00204

Economic Variables
Num. of slaves

[0.00220]

[0.00298]

[0.00142]

[0.00143]

[0.00510]

Priv. securities

0.0982

0.0216

0.330

0.240

-0.373

[0.539]

[0.583]

[0.343]

[0.505]

[0.860]

Pub. securities

0.736***

0.829***

0.965****

0.969****

0.550**

[0.361]

[0.349]

[0.275]

[0.270]

[0.301]

0.478

0.381

0.358

0.292

0.623*

Western land
Distance
Joint Significance (P-Values)

[0.401]

[0.376]

[0.420]

[0.456]

[0.437]

0.00360

0.00223

0.00235

0.00227

-0.000267

[0.00570]

[0.00555]

[0.00630]

[0.00612]

[0.00546]

0.0001****

0.0001****

0.0000****

0.0000****

0.0062***

0.00384****

0.00350***

0.00239**

0.00241**

0.00366****

[0.00140]

[0.00141]

[0.00140]

[0.00142]

[0.00128]

-0.0739

-0.0760

0.0376

0.0315

-0.172

[0.279]

[0.272]

[0.307]

[0.296]

[0.239]

Post-G.C. Interactions
Num. of slaves
Priv. securities
Pub. securities
Western land
Distance
Joint Significance (P-Values)

-0.444

-0.432

-0.496

-0.543*

-0.350

[0.496]

[0.494]

[0.444]

[0.391]

[0.407]

0.463

0.446

0.405

0.418

0.253

[0.365]

[0.378]

[0.389]

[0.397]

[0.368]

0.0208***

0.0176***

0.0164***

0.0175***

0.0192***

[0.00919]

[0.00715]

[0.00813]

[0.00893]

[0.00970]

0.0000****

0.0002****

0.0491***

0.0700**

0.0006****

1.284****

1.336****

1.114***

1.185***

0.919****

[0.396]

[0.514]

[0.479]

[0.518]

[0.330]

0.821***

0.581****

0.576**

0.618**

1.033****

[0.209]

[0.208]

[0.308]

[0.338]

[0.345]

Noneconomic Variables
Rev. War Officer
Hierarchical
Communitarian
Age
Legislative Experience

0.0854

0.1000

0.225

0.255

0.285

[0.340]

[0.302]

[0.357]

[0.395]

[0.313]

-0.0132

-0.0103

-0.0138

-0.0126

-0.0144***

[0.0120]

[0.0115]

[0.0120]

[0.0132]

[0.00587]

-0.00732

-0.00480

0.0234

0.0227

-0.0475*
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Executive Experience
Judicial Experience
Joint Significance (P-Values)

[0.0361]

[0.0379]

[0.0307]

[0.0311]

[0.0309]

0.0192

0.00741

0.00481

0.00339

0.0412***

[0.0268]

[0.0285]

[0.0244]

[0.0246]

[0.0174]

-0.00645

-0.0297**

-0.0322**

-0.0278***

0.0494*

[0.0217]

[0.0165]

[0.0188]

[0.0115]

[0.0330]

0.0000****

0.0000****

0.0000****

0.0000****

0.0000****

0.341***

0.302***

0.139

0.149

0.496**

[0.151]

[0.137]

[0.122]

[0.123]

[0.280]

Structural Controls
Delegation Size
Even
Post

0.184*
[0.125]
-0.0400
[0.343]
-0.149
[0.242]

Deep South

-0.243

-0.150

-0.151

-0.190

0.151

[0.320]

[0.286]

[0.244]

[0.254]

[0.286]

-0.467

-0.460

-0.322

-0.306

-0.323

[0.447]

[0.440]

[0.437]

[0.404]

[0.329]

0.627*
[0.488]

New England

1.117**

0.842

[0.592]

[0.699]

South

-0.112
[0.796]

Population (ten thousand)

0.000115

0.0195

[0.00942]

[0.0562]

Population Squared

-0.0000191
[0.0000509]

State Fixed Effects3

Constant

****

-2.294
[0.645]

-4.238

-3.785

-3.054

-3.556

-4.857

[0.912]

[1.052]

[0.801]

[1.556]

[1.361]

Observations
3,205
3,205
3,205
*indicates significance at the 20% level; ** at the 10%; *** at the 5%; ****at the 1%

3,205

3,205

3,205
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A.2 Correlation Matrix

st_de

st_de
1

size

Even

nslave

dbank

dsecr

dland

dist

dfarm

merchant

revoffco

hierar~l

commun~n

dengl

age

legis

size

0.24

1

even

-0.11

-0.19

1

nslave

0.15

0.2

0

1

dbank

-0.02

0.16

0.14

-0.02

1

dsecr

-0.11

-0.43

0.09

-0.46

0.03

1

dland

0.17

0.34

-0.33

0.17

0.11

-0.17

1

dist

0.03

-0.01

-0.02

0.06

-0.1

0

-0.1

1

dfarm

-0.12

-0.23

0.07

-0.03

-0.24

0.02

-0.17

-0.13

1

merch

-0.11

-0.3

-0.03

-0.25

-0.08

0.28

0.02

-0.15

-0.11

revoff

0.01

-0.19

0.17

-0.12

-0.32

0.2

-0.18

-0.18

0.34

0.05

1

hier~l

0.25

0.53

-0.27

0.48

-0.05

-0.6

0.15

-0.07

-0.11

-0.37

-0.16

1

com~n

-0.14

-0.2

0.19

-0.43

0.29

0.4

0.06

-0.04

-0.33

0.44

-0.08

-0.68

1

dengl

-0.09

-0.2

0.01

-0.06

-0.21

0.09

-0.11

0.03

0.22

0.36

0

-0.11

-0.11

1

age
legis

0.01
0

0.08
-0.01

-0.11
0

0.16
0.05

-0.16
-0.23

-0.16
0

0.24
0.1

-0.18
-0.17

-0.04
-0.02

0.28
0.31

-0.33
-0.23

0.05
-0.12

0.07
0.12

0.21
0.24

1
0.74

1

exec

-0.01

0.15

0.05

-0.06

-0.1

0.01

-0.11

0.07

0.08

0.13

-0.21

-0.11

0.11

0.27

0.5

0.48

exec

judicial

south

newen.

dp. sou

pop

1

1

judicial

0.02

0.02

-0.12

0.41

-0.1

-0.05

0.12

-0.03

0.02

0.19

-0.24

0.07

-0.06

0.28

0.68

0.51

0.18

1

south

-0.05

-0.25

0.27

0.11

0

0.09

-0.16

-0.09

0.4

-0.42

0.25

-0.18

-0.09

-0.52

-0.35

-0.19

-0.26

-0.3

1

neweng

-0.12

-0.41

0.04

-0.38

-0.08

0.29

-0.07

-0.14

-0.29

0.66

-0.07

-0.35

0.44

0.53

0.25

0.34

0.14

0.05

-0.52

1

dp.sou

0.03

-0.04

0.06

0.5

-0.09

-0.07

-0.11

0.13

0.37

-0.47

0.07

0.18

-0.4

-0.33

-0.23

-0.29

-0.22

0.04

0.69

-0.75

1

poptot

0.24

0.5

-0.29

0.51

-0.01

-0.37

0.43

0.32

-0.29

-0.18

-0.34

0.54

-0.36

0.2

0.14

0.03

0.01

0.3

-0.42

-0.18

0.14

1

popsq

0.21

0.4

-0.22

0.57

0.01

-0.31

0.34

0.35

-0.22

-0.23

-0.27

0.48

-0.36

0.2

0.07

-0.02

-0.04

0.29

-0.34

-0.24

0.25

0.96
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